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Abstract
It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give
money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to
take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a
signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be consid-
ered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice
set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set
effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the
general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator
giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish
or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.
JEL Classification Numbers: C91, D63
1 Introduction
It is of great importance to understand what motivates distributive behavior, and the
dictator game has been an important workhorse for research in this field. Recent stud-
ies (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008), however, show that a dictator’s choice set matters in
a manner that cannot easily be explained by standard distributional preference mod-
els (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cappelen, Drange Hole,
Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2007). In particular, it is shown that extending the choice
set so that dictators also can take money from the recipient dramatically lowers the
fraction of dictators giving away a positive amount. This choice-set effect is hard to
reconcile with dictators being exclusively motivated by distributional concerns. In this
paper, we address the question of why the choice set matters in this way.
∗We thank Tobias Christiani for programming support and Eva Gregersen, Nikolaos Korfiatis,
Thomas A. Stephens, and Erik Wengstro¨m for effective research assistance. The project was financed
by support from the Carlsberg Foundation and the Research Council of Norway, research grant 202484.
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One possible explanation is that the choice set provides a signal about entitlements
in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear.1 A standard dic-
tator game is an artificial situation for most participants, where the dictator may be
unsure about the extent to which she can think of the overall endowment, which is
“manna from heaven”, as her own money. In such a context, one can envision that
when the dictator is given a choice set that allows her to take money from the other
participant, this may strengthen the dictator’s feeling that she is entitled to the overall
endowment. To illustrate, a dictator only facing the option of giving money to the other
participant may consider her equally entitled to the endowment and, consequently, may
end up sharing equally, whereas the same dictator also having the option to take money
away from the other participant may perceive this as a signal that she is entitled to the
overall endowment and, consequently, may end up taking everything. This entitlement
mechanism could potentially explain the role of the choice set observed in List (2007)
and Bardsley (2008).
To test this mechanism, we designed a dictator game experiment with four treat-
ments differing along two dimensions: the dictator faced either a give or take choice
set and the entitlements were established either through experimental instructions only
or by including a production phase. This design allows us to compare the effect of ex-
tending the choice set in the standard dictator game and in a dictator game with explicit
entitlements created through a production phase, where a premise for the analysis is
that the production phase removes any uncertainty about entitlements.
We find that the effect of introducing a take option is equally strong in a dictator
game with explicit entitlements as it is in the standard dictator game, in which there
might be uncertainty about the entitlements. In both cases, the share of dictators trans-
ferring a positive amount falls from about 75% in the give treatment to about 35% in
the take treatment. This result calls for alternative explanations of why the share of
positive transfers drops dramatically when the choice set is extended.
The present experiment also provides a test of the robustness of the results pre-
sented in List (2007) and Bardsley (2008). They conducted laboratory experiments
using student samples, which raises the question of whether the results would carry
over to a more general sample and to an environment without the experimenter’s vis-
ible presence. The present experiment was conducted via the internet and the partici-
pants were recruited from the general adult population in Denmark, thus representing
a less intrusive environment than the classical lab setting and including a more het-
erogeneous group than a standard student sample. We show that the main result in in
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) indeed carries over to this environment, and that the
choice-set effect is strong in all subgroups in our sample.
1More generally, recent research has shown that entitlements are crucial in determining dictator
giving behavior (Konow, 2000; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007; Alma˚s,
Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2010; Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, and Tungodden, forthcoming).
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2 Design and sample
We implemented four dictator game treatments in a between-subjects design. Two of
the treatments, Give and Take, were replications of the Baseline and Take ($5) treat-
ments in List (2007), respectively. Each subject was told that she was matched with
another participant and that they had received 300 DKK (≈ 50$) in total. Furthermore,
they were told that the dictator was tentatively allocated 200 DKK and that the recipient
was tentatively allocated 100 DKK.2 The two treatments differed only in the dictator’s
choice set. In Give, the dictator could transfer any amount τGive = {0,10, . . . ,100}
from his tentative allocation to the recipient; in Take, the dictator could also take some
or all of the recipient’s tentative allocation, i.e. the dictator could transfer any amount
τTake = {−100,−90, . . . ,100}.
The two additional treatments, Work-Give and Work-Take, were identical to Give
and Take in the distribution phase, only differing in including a production phase that
preceded the distribution phase. In the production phase each subject had to count
orange-colored cells in a 10× 10 grid and earned 150 DKK if she submitted 12 correct
answers within five minutes. The total earnings in the production phase constituted
then the endowment to be distributed in the distribution phase. The key feature of
Work-Give and Work-Take was that the subjects earned exactly the same amount of
money for the same amount of work, which should remove any uncertainty about
them having equal entitlements to the total earnings in the distribution phase.3 In
contrast, the participants in the Give and Take could potentially have been uncertain
about their entitlements to the overall endowment, since in these treatments the money
to be distributed was “manna from heaven”.
The experiment was run at the Internet Laboratory for Experimental Economics
(iLEE) in June-July 2011 with a heterogeneous subject pool that is close to being rep-
resentative of the general adult population in Denmark on age, education, and gender.4
Subjects were recruited in collaboration with Statistics Denmark (SD), which invited
randomly selected adults aged 21-84 years from the general population in Denmark to
participate by sending them a hard-copy letter. Subjects then logged into the internet
platform using a code and the key to this code was only known to SD (and not to the
experimenter). The data was later sent to SD and matched with register data on gender,
age, and education, and payments were effected through electronic transfer.
A total of 881 subjects participated in the experiment.5 Subjects were assigned to
one of four treatments as they logged into the experiment, and the role as dictator or
2A translated version of the instructions is available in the Supplementary Online Materials.
3In this respect, these treatments differ fundamentally from the Earnings treatment in List (2007),
where the dictator earned twice as much as the recipient for the same job. In such a setting, people may
have very different views about individual entitlements to the total earnings (Cappelen et al., 2007).
4On average, the participants are 49.3 years old (s.d. 15.2 years) and have 13.6 years of education
(s.d. 2.4 years); the share of women is 48.2%. For further details, see Supplementary Online Materials.
521 participants assigned to Work-Give and Work-Take did not complete the production task, and,
therefore, did not take part in the distribution phase.
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recipient as they entered the distribution phase. The experiment was double-blind with
subject-subject and subject-experimenter anonymity.
3 Results
The distribution of transfers from the dictator to the recipient is presented in Figure 1,
whereas Table 1 reports the main aggregate statistics.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Table 1 about here.]
The two upper panels in Figure 1 provide a strikingly similar picture as reported in
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008). The Give treatment replicates standard behavior in a
dictator game, whereas the Take treatment shows that when the choice set is extended,
there is a dramatic drop in the share of dictators transferring a positive amount to
the recipient, from 73.9% to 33.9%.6 This choice-set effect cannot be reconciled with
standard distributional models, which predict that dictators transferring a positive share
in the Give treatment would transfer the same amount in the Take treatment. The
two lower panels show that exactly the same picture emerges for the Work-Give and
Work-Take treatments, where 70.8% and 35.6% of the dictators, respectively, transfer
a positive share to the recipient.7 Thus, uncertainty about entitlements cannot explain
the choice-set effect.
The heterogenous sample of participants allows us to study whether the choice-
set effect depends on subject characteristics. Table 2 reports regressions of whether
a person has transferred a positive share to the recipient on dummies for whether the
participant was allocated to a take treatment or a work treatment, background vari-
ables, and interaction variables.8 The regressions confirm that the choice-set effect is
statistically significant and independent of the introduction of a production phase. Fur-
thermore, from the regressions including subgroup interaction variables, we observe
that the choice-set effect is strong and not statistically significantly different across
gender, age, and education.
[Table 2 about here.]
6List (2007) observes an even larger drop in transfers, the difference between the Baseline treatment
and the “Take ($5)” treatment is 71 percent versus 10 percent.
7Comparing Give and Work-Give, and Take and Work-Take, we observe that the distribution of
transfers is not affected by the introduction of a production phase, which suggests that the dictators
even in the Take and Give treatments perceived the two of them to have equal entitlements to the overall
endowment.
8In the Supplementary Online Materials, we present a corresponding table where the dependent
variable is the amount transferred by the dictator to the recipient.
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4 Conclusion
The present study documents that the choice-set effect identified in List (2007) and
Bardsley (2008) is highly robust. It is substantial also in a setting where any uncer-
tainty about the entitlements has been removed, and it is equally strong across sub-
groups in a heterogenous non-student sample. This suggests that the choice-set effect
captures a fundamental dimension of individual behavior in the dictator game.
Our results are consistent with giving in the dictator game partly being motivated
by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009) or
by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent (List, 2007; Bardsley,
2008), but more research is needed to fully understand the underlying mechanisms of
the choice-set effect.
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Figure 1: Distribution of transfers
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Note: The panels show, by treatment, the distribution of transfers from the dictator to
the recipient in DKK.
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Table 1: Aggregate summary statistics
Treatment n Share of positive transfers Median transfer Mean transfer
Give 111 0.739 30 29.0
(0.042) (5.5) (2.1)
Take 109 0.339 0 −21.3
(0.046) (8.4) (5.6)
Work-Give 106 0.708 40 30.6
(0.044) (6.8) (2.2)
Work-Take 104 0.356 0 −24.4
(0.047) (13.1) (6.0)
Note: Median and mean transfers are in DKK. Standard errors in parentheses. Median
transfer standard errors are bootstrapped using 1,000 replications.
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Table 2: Regression: Positive transfer to recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Take −0.40∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Work −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Work × Take 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Female × Take −0.10
(0.09)
Age × Take −0.13
(0.09)
Education × Take −0.03
(0.09)
Female −0.11∗ −0.06 −0.11∗ −0.11∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Age 0.10∗ 0.11∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.10∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Education −0.10∗ −0.10∗ −0.10∗ −0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 0.74∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 430 415 415 415 415
R2 0.143 0.171 0.173 0.175 0.171
Note: The table reports linear probability regressions where the dependent variable is
a dummy that has value 1 if the dictator transferred a strictly positive amount to the
recipient. “Take” is a dummy that has value 1 if the dictator was in treatment Take or
Work-Take; “Female” is a dummy that has value 1 if the dictator is a female; “Age” is
a dummy that has value 1 if the dictator is 50+ years old at 01.01.2011; “Education” is
a dummy that has value 1 if the dictator has completed more than 13 years of education
which is equivalent to a high school degree. In the regressions in columns (2)-(5), we
have excluded 15 dictators for whom we do not have register data. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001).
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This document provides supplementary material to Cappelen, Nielsen, Sørensen,
Tungodden, and Tyran (2012), including a description of our sample (Section 1),
a regression analysis (Section 2), and translated instructions (Section 3). A full
description of how the experiment reported here is embedded into the iLEE4
project can be found at: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cee/iLEE/iLEE_
descriptionLEE4.htm
1 Sample
As referred to in footnote 4 in the main paper, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics
on the socioeconomics variables used in the analysis, and a comparison to a random
sample of the Danish population.
2 Regression results
Table 2 presents the regressions referred to in footnote 8 in the main text.
1
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Table 1: Description and representativeness of the sample
Variable 25th
percentile
Median 75th
percentile
Mean
Age 40 50 61 49.3
(1.2) (0.7) (0.9) (0.5)
Age (pop.) 38 50 63 50.5
(—) (0.4) (0.1) (0.1)
Education 12.0 13.0 15.2 13.6
(0.0) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Education (pop.) 10.0 13.0 14.0 12.3
(—) (—) (—) (0.1)
Female 0.48
(0.02)
Female (pop.) 0.51
(0.00)
Note: “Age” is measured in years at 01.01.2011 and “Education” is measured in years
from 1st grade to highest level of completed or enrolled education. Standard errors of
means in parentheses. The reference sample for the population statistics is a random
sample of 38,581 Danes aged 21-84 provided by Statistics Denmark. The percentile
standard errors are calculated using 1,000 bootstrap replications.
2
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Table 2: Regression: Transfer from dictator to recipient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Take −50.3∗∗∗ −48.6∗∗∗ −49.5∗∗∗ −47.0∗∗∗ −44.8∗∗∗
(6.02) (6.19) (8.07) (7.82) (6.96)
Work 1.56 2.55 2.54 2.59 2.20
(3.04) (3.07) (3.08) (3.08) (3.06)
Work × Take −4.70 −8.19 −8.04 −8.23 −7.32∗∗
(8.80) (8.95) (9.04) (8.96) (9.09)
Female × Take 1.70
(8.85)
Age × Take −3.10
(8.97)
Education × Take −8.47
(9.16)
Female −3.84 −4.65 −3.78 −3.69
(4.31) (3.16) (4.30) (4.31)
Age 8.20 8.16 9.72∗∗ 8.00
(4.42) (4.43) (3.12) (4.45)
Education −5.10 −5.12 −5.16 −0.93
(4.51) (4.53) (4.55) (3.14)
Constant 29.0∗∗∗ 28.4∗∗∗ 28.9∗∗∗ 27.6∗∗∗ 26.5∗∗∗
(2.13) (4.86) (4.65) (4.40) (4.48)
Observations 430 415 415 415 415
R2 0.254 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.268
Note: The table reports OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the amount
(in DKK) that the dictator transferred to the recipient. “Take” is a dummy that has
value 1 if the dictator was in treatment Take or Work-Take; “Female” is a dummy
that has value 1 if the dictator is a female; “Age” is a dummy that has value 1 if the
dictator is 50+ years old at 01.01.2011; “Education” is a dummy that has value 1 if
the dictator has completed more than 13 years of education which equivalent to a high
school degree. In the regressions in columns (2)-(5), we have excluded 15 dictators for
whom we do not have register data. Robust standard errors in parentheses (∗ p< 0.05,
∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001).
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3 Instructions (translated)
3.1 Treatment Give: Dictator
[Screen 1] You are now paired with another participant. You will not be told who you
are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who
you are either during or after the experiment.
Both of you have been allocated 100 DKK in this part of the experiment. In addition,
you have been provisionally allocated an additional 100 DKK. The other participant
has not been allocated these additional 100 DKK.
Your decision is a simple one: Decide what portion, if any, of these 100 DKK to
transfer to the other person. You can choose any amount from 0 DKK to 100 DKK
that can be divided by 10 DKK. Your payment is your initial 100 DKK allocation
plus the amount that is allocated to you given your decision. The other participant’s
payment is his or her initial 100 DKK plus the amount that follows from your decision.
The other person will not make any decision, but he or she has the opportunity to
read the instructions we have given to you. Similarly, you can read the instructions
given to the other person by clicking the button “The other’s instructions” in the top-
right corner. [See Section 3.2]
[Screen 2] You now have to choose how much you would like to transfer to the other
participant.
How much would you like to transfer to the other participant?
• 0 DKK
• 10 DKK
• 20 DKK
• 30 DKK
• 40 DKK
• 50 DKK
• 60 DKK
• 70 DKK
• 80 DKK
• 90 DKK
4
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• 100 DKK
3.2 Treatment Give: Recipient
[Screen 1] You are now paired with another participant. You will not be told who you
are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who
you are either during or after the experiment.
Both of you have been allocated 100 DKK in this part of the experiment. In addi-
tion, the other participant has been provisionally allocated an additional 100 DKK.
You have not been allocated these additional 100 DKK.
The other participant has been asked to make a simple decision: Decide what por-
tion, if any, of these 100 DKK to transfer to you. He or she can choose any amount
from 0 DKK to 100 DKK that can be divided by 10 DKK. Your payment is your
initial 100 DKK allocation plus the amount that is allocated to you given the other
participant’s decision. The other participant’s payment is his or her initial 100 DKK
plus the amount that follows from his or her decision.
You will not make any decision, but you have the opportunity to read the instructions
we have given to the other participant by clicking the button “The other’s instruc-
tions” in the top-right corner. [See Section 3.1] Similarly, the other participant can
read the instructions given to you.
3.3 Treatment Take: Dictator
[Screen 1] You are now paired with another participant. You will not be told who you
are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who
you are either during or after the experiment.
Both of you have been allocated 100 DKK in this part of the experiment. In addition,
you have been provisionally allocated an additional 100 DKK. The other participant
has not been allocated these additional 100 DKK.
Your decision is a simple one: Decide what portion, if any, of these 100 DKK to
transfer to the other person. You can also transfer a negative amount. This means that
you can take up to 100 DKK from the other participant. You can choose any amount
from -100 DKK to 100 DKK that can be divided by 10 DKK. Your payment is your
initial 100 DKK allocation plus the amount that is allocated to you given your deci-
sion. The other participant’s payment is his or her initial 100 DKK plus the amount
that follows from your decision.
The other person will not make any decision, but he or she has the opportunity to
5
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read the instructions we have given to you. Similarly, you can read the instructions
given to the other person by clicking the button “The other’s instructions” in the top-
right corner. [See Section 3.4]
[Screen 2] You now have to choose how much you would like to transfer to the other
participant. You can also transfer a negative amount. This means that can take up to
100 DKK from the other participant.
How much would you like to transfer to the other participant?
• -100 DKK
• -90 DKK
• -80 DKK
• -70 DKK
• -60 DKK
• -50 DKK
• -40 DKK
• -30 DKK
• -20 DKK
• -10 DKK
• 0 DKK
• 10 DKK
• 20 DKK
• 30 DKK
• 40 DKK
• 50 DKK
• 60 DKK
• 70 DKK
• 80 DKK
• 90 DKK
• 100 DKK
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Figure 1: An example of a 10×10 grid for the work task
3.4 Treatment Take: Recipient
[Screen 1] You are now paired with another participant. You will not be told who you
are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who
you are either during or after the experiment.
Both of you have been allocated 100 DKK in this part of the experiment. In addi-
tion, the other participant has been provisionally allocated an additional 100 DKK.
You have not been allocated these additional 100 DKK.
The other participant has been asked to make a simple decision: Decide what por-
tion, if any, of these 100 DKK to transfer to you. He or she can also transfer a negative
amount. This means that the other participant can take up to 100 DKK from you. He
or she can choose any amount from 0 DKK to 100 DKK that can be divided by 10
DKK. Your payment is your initial 100 DKK allocation plus the amount that is allo-
cated to you given the other participant’s decision. The other participant’s payment
is his or her initial 100 DKK plus the amount that follows from his or her decision.
You will not make any decision, but you have the opportunity to read the instructions
we have given to the other participant by clicking the button “The other’s instruc-
tions” in the top-right corner. [See Section 3.3] Similarly, the other participant can
read the instructions given to you.
3.5 Treatment Work-Give: Dictator
[Screen 1] In this part of the experiment, we ask you to do a task. The task is to count
orange cells. [See Figure 1] You earn 1 point per correct answer. In order to pass the
7
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task, you need 12 points within 5 minutes. If you pass the task, you earn 150 DKK
and is directed to a distribution phase. If you fail the task, you earn 0 DKK and is
directed to the next part of the experiment.
In the distribution phase you will paired with another participant, who has also passed
the task and earned 150 DKK. You will not be told who you are matched with during
or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who you are either during or
after the experiment. One of you will randomly be chosen to decide how your total
income of 300 DKK should be shared among you.
You can read more about the distribution phase if you pass the task.
When you press “Continue”, your 5 minutes start. You cannot stop the time - not
even by logging out.
[Screen 2] See Section 3.9.
[Screen 3] You are now paired with another participant. You will not be told who
you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told
who you are either during or after the experiment.
Both of you have been allocated 100 DKK in this part of the experiment. In addition,
you have been provisionally allocated an additional 100 DKK. The other participant
has not been allocated these additional 100 DKK.
Your decision is a simple one: Decide what portion, if any, of these 100 DKK to
transfer to the other person. You can choose any amount from 0 DKK to 100 DKK
that can be divided by 10 DKK. Your payment is your initial 100 DKK allocation
plus the amount that is allocated to you given your decision. The other participant’s
payment is his or her initial 100 DKK plus the amount that follows from your decision.
The other person will not make any decision, but he or she has the opportunity to
read the instructions we have given to you. Similarly, you can read the instructions
given to the other person by clicking the button “The other’s instructions” in the top-
right corner. [See Section 3.6]
[Screen 4] You now have to choose, how much you would like to transfer to the other
participant.
How much would you like to transfer to the other participant?
• 0 DKK
• 10 DKK
8
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• 20 DKK
• 30 DKK
• 40 DKK
• 50 DKK
• 60 DKK
• 70 DKK
• 80 DKK
• 90 DKK
• 100 DKK
3.6 Treatment Work-Give: Recipient
[Screen 1] In this part of the experiment, we ask you to do a task. The task is to count
orange cells. [See Figure 1] You earn 1 point per correct answer. In order to pass the
task, you need 12 points within 5 minutes. If you pass the task, you earn 150 DKK
and is directed to a distribution phase. If you fail the task, you earn 0 DKK and is
directed to the next part of the experiment.
In the distribution phase you will paired with another participant, who has also passed
the task and earned 150 DKK. You will not be told who you are matched with during
or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who you are either during or
after the experiment. One of you will randomly be chosen to decide how your total
income of 300 DKK should be shared among you.
You can read more about the distribution phase if you pass the task.
When you press “Continue”, your 5 minutes start. You cannot stop the time - not
even by logging out.
[Screen 2] See Section 3.9.
[Screen 3] You are now paired with another participant. You will not be told who
you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told
who you are either during or after the experiment.
Both of you have been allocated 100 DKK in this part of the experiment. In addi-
tion, the other participant has been provisionally allocated an additional 100 DKK.
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You have not been allocated these additional 100 DKK.
The other participant has been asked to make a simple decision: Decide what por-
tion, if any, of these 100 DKK to transfer to you. He or she can choose any amount
from 0 DKK to 100 DKK that can be divided by 10 DKK. Your payment is your
initial 100 DKK allocation plus the amount that is allocated to you given the other
participant’s decision. The other participant’s payment is his or her initial 100 DKK
plus the amount that follows from his or her decision.
You will not make any decision, but you have the opportunity to read the instructions
we have given to the other participant by clicking the button “The other’s instruc-
tions” in the top-right corner. [See Section 3.5] Similarly, the other participant can
read the instructions given to you.
3.7 Treatment Work-Take: Dictator
[Screen 1] In this part of the experiment, we ask you to do a task. The task is to count
orange cells. [See Figure 1] You earn 1 point per correct answer. In order to pass the
task, you need 12 points within 5 minutes. If you pass the task, you earn 150 DKK
and is directed to a distribution phase. If you fail the task, you earn 0 DKK and is
directed to the next part of the experiment.
In the distribution phase you will paired with another participant, who has also passed
the task and earned 150 DKK. You will not be told who you are matched with during
or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who you are either during or
after the experiment. One of you will randomly be chosen to decide how your total
income of 300 DKK should be shared among you.
You can read more about the distribution phase if you pass the task.
When you press “Continue”, your 5 minutes start. You cannot stop the time - not
even by logging out.
[Screen 2] See Section 3.9.
[Screen 3] You are now paired with another participant. You will not be told who
you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told
who you are either during or after the experiment.
Both of you have been allocated 100 DKK in this part of the experiment. In addition,
you have been provisionally allocated an additional 100 DKK. The other participant
has not been allocated these additional 100 DKK.
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Your decision is a simple one: Decide what portion, if any, of these 100 DKK to
transfer to the other person. You can also transfer a negative amount. This means that
you can take up to 100 DKK from the other participant. You can choose any amount
from -100 DKK to 100 DKK that can be divided by 10 DKK. Your payment is your
initial 100 DKK allocation plus the amount that is allocated to you given your deci-
sion. The other participant’s payment is his or her initial 100 DKK plus the amount
that follows from your decision.
The other person will not make any decision, but he or she has the opportunity to
read the instructions we have given to you. Similarly, you can read the instructions
given to the other person by clicking the button “The other’s instructions” in the top-
right corner. [See Section 3.8]
[Screen 4] You now have to choose, how much you would like to transfer to the other
participant. You can also transfer a negative amount. This means that can take up to
100 DKK from the other participant.
How much would you like to transfer to the other participant?
• -100 DKK
• -90 DKK
• -80 DKK
• -70 DKK
• -60 DKK
• -50 DKK
• -40 DKK
• -30 DKK
• -20 DKK
• -10 DKK
• 0 DKK
• 10 DKK
• 20 DKK
• 30 DKK
• 40 DKK
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• 50 DKK
• 60 DKK
• 70 DKK
• 80 DKK
• 90 DKK
• 100 DKK
3.8 Treatment Work-Take: Recipient
[Screen 1] In this part of the experiment, we ask you to do a task. The task is to count
orange cells. [See Figure 1] You earn 1 point per correct answer. In order to pass the
task, you need 12 points within 5 minutes. If you pass the task, you earn 150 DKK
and is directed to a distribution phase. If you fail the task, you earn 0 DKK and is
directed to the next part of the experiment.
In the distribution phase you will paired with another participant, who has also passed
the task and earned 150 DKK. You will not be told who you are matched with during
or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told who you are either during or
after the experiment. One of you will randomly be chosen to decide how your total
income of 300 DKK should be shared among you.
You can read more about the distribution phase if you pass the task.
When you press “Continue”, your 5 minutes start. You cannot stop the time - not
even by logging out.
[Screen 2] See Section 3.9.
[Screen 3] You are now paired with another participant. You will not be told who
you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will not be told
who you are either during or after the experiment.
Both of you have been allocated 100 DKK in this part of the experiment. In addi-
tion, the other participant has been provisionally allocated an additional 100 DKK.
You have not been allocated these additional 100 DKK.
The other participant has been asked to make a simple decision: Decide what por-
tion, if any, of these 100 DKK to transfer to you. He or she can also transfer a negative
amount. This means that the other participant can take up to 100 DKK from you. He
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or she can choose any amount from 0 DKK to 100 DKK that can be divided by 10
DKK. Your payment is your initial 100 DKK allocation plus the amount that is allo-
cated to you given the other participant’s decision. The other participant’s payment
is his or her initial 100 DKK plus the amount that follows from his or her decision.
You will not make any decision, but you have the opportunity to read the instructions
we have given to the other participant by clicking the button “The other’s instruc-
tions” in the top-right corner. [See Section 3.7] Similarly, the other participant can
read the instructions given to you.
3.9 Work task
Figure 1 shows the 10×10 grid in which subjects had to count orange-colored cells. A
new grid appeared every time a correct answer was submitted. The grids were shown
in fixed order and the numbers of orange-colored cells were (in chronological order):
15, 11, 21, 18, 9, 11, 18, 16, 15, 15, 11, 20.
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